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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROPOSED SOUTH CAROLINA
INDIGENT DEFENDANT ACT*
Since Gideon v. Wainwright the states have been faced with
the problem of determining the nature and extent of the con-
stitutionally imposed requirement of appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants.2 The Proposed South Carolina Indigent
Defendant Act, introduced this year before the general as-
sembly, is an effort to resolve this problem." This comment pro-
poses to examine that bill in light of the constitutional require-
ments delineated by cases before and after Gideon4 and to make
brief footnote references to other legislative reaction to the
problem.
A. What Criminal Prosecutions Require Appointed CounseZ?
Prior to Gideon the accused had the right to appointed counsel
in state courts in capital cases5 but not, in the absence of special
circumstances, in non capital cases.6 Although Gideon erased
* A BILL-PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL TO REPRESENT IN-
DIGENT DEFENDANTS (S.C. 1965).
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a discussion of the history of right to counsel
see 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018 (1964).
2. See the study made in 1963 by Clack D. Hopkins, Jr., Esq., reporter for
the South Carolina Bar Association, on the present practices of appointment of
counsel in South Carolina. The study includes the results of discussions with
attorneys, solicitors and judges and their reactions to the problems presented.
This study, together with other state practices over the United States, is dis-
cussed in SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS (1965) (hereafter referred to as SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE
POOR).
3. A BILL-PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL TO REPRESENT IN-
DIGENT DEFENDANTS (Calendar No. H.1762. Read for the first time May 20,
1965) [hereinafter referred to as PROPOSED BILL]. This bill is copied sub-
stantially from the North Carolina provision for appointment of counsel, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (Supp. 1963). See generally 42 N.C.L. REv. 322 (1964).
The recommendations of the South Carolina Legislative Committee are con-
tained in Report of Committee to Investigate the Matter of the Appointment of
Attorneys for Persons Accused of Crimes (Comm. Print 1964) hereafter re-
ferred to as South Carolina Legislative Comm. Rep. (Comm. Print 1964).
4. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel In Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1963) for an
exhaustive treatment on many of the questions raised by Gideon.
5. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Prior to Gideon, in South Carolina
the accused was guaranteed the right to counsel by the SOUTH CAROLINA CONST.
art. I, § 18, and appointed counsel was guaranteed by S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-507
(1962). In accord with Betts v. Brady, supra, these provisions only applied to
capital cases, absent special circumstances. See Shelton v. State, 239 S.C. 535,
123 S.E.2d 867 (1962). Shelton was later overruled by Pitt v. MacDougall,
245 S.C. 98, 138 S.E.2d 840 (1964) where the court recognized that there was
no distinction between capital and non capital cases.
1
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this capital-non capital distinction by applying the sixth amend-
ment guaranteed right to counsel in "criminal prosecutions" to
state courts,7 it failed to define what criminal prosecutions re-
quired appointed counsel,8 and this failure has led to inconsis-
tency in state decisions.0 Despite this inconsistency, it may be
argued that the nature of the offense is determinative of the
need for counsel. 10 Consequently, the fact that the charge is
serious" or that a substantial prison sentence is involved 12 may
alone provide sufficient constitutional basis for a required ap-
pointment. The traditional felony-misdemeanor breakdown of
the nature of the offense would not appear to meet these
standards.' 3
If the seriousness of the offense charged does become the test
for appointment of counsel, the South Carolina bill appears to
conform to this test by its emphasis on the length of the possible
prison sentence. It requires the appointment of counsel where
the crime is one for which a sentence of six months or more may
be imposed. 14
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. "Whether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need not now be
decided." Gideon v. Wainwright, mipra note 7, at 351 (concurring opinion).
9. Compare People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.
2d 413 (1965) (right of accused to appointed counsel where charged with steal-
ing a half bushel of apples valued at two dollars and sentenced to thirty days
or twenty five dollars) with State v. Lee, 143 S.E.d 604 (S.C. 1965) (no right
to appointed counsel in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, an offense
which under S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-345 (1962) carries a fifty dollar fine and
not more than thirty days).
10. "It is 'The nature of the charge.. .' that underlines the need for counsel."
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 446 (1962).
11. Some members of the Court think that where serious offenses are charged,
failure of a court to offer counsel in state criminal trials deprives an ac-
cused of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment... Others of us think
that when a crime subject to capital punishment is not involved, each case
depends on its own facts. See Betts v. Brady [citation omitted] .... The
philosophy behind both of these views is that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires counsel for all persons charged with
serious crimes.
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1948).
12. See Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 351
(1963).
13. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-56 (1962) (felony to administer poison-
sentence not more than ten years nor less than two years) wuith S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-359.1 (1962) (shoplifting-sentence for third offense not less than
one nor more than five years). Although not specified as a misdemeanor the
latter section bears such an interpretation under S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-12 (1962)
(All offenses not specified as felonies are considered to be misdemeanors).
This comparison indicates that there is no logical breakdown between felonies
and misdemeanors as to the possible length of the prison sentence and the
seriousness of the crime.
14. PROPOSED BILL § 1. In cases where the charge could carry a sentence of
less than six months, the judge can appoint counsel at his discretion. The
federal enactment provides for appointed counsel in every criminal case where
[Vol. 17
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B. When Does Right to JounseZ Begin?
The South Carolina bill provides for appointment of counsel
after a determination of indigency and before the defendant is
required to plead 15 and therefore satisfies the Gideon requirement
that counsel be appointed at least by the time of trial. The con-
stitutional question left unanswered by Gideon, however, is at
what time prior to trial counsel must be appointed. The Supreme
Court has said only that counsel must be appointed at the
"critical stage" of the proceedings16 and has held that an Ala-
bama arraignment was such a stage.17 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court has also declared that arraignment requires appoint-
ed counsel. 18 More recently, in White v. Maryland,'9 the Court
held a preliminary hearing in Maryland to be a critical stage
in the criminal prosecution. However, in South Carolina, our
court has decided that a preliminary hearing was not a critical
stage,20 distinguishing White on the ground that the rights of
the accused would not be prejudiced. In this state the only pur-
pose of the preliminary hearing is to allow the state to show
probable cause for binding the defendant over for grand jury
action.2 ' The defendant is not permitted to plead, and any state-
a defendant is charged with a "felony or a misdemeanor other than a petty
offense." CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (b) (Supp. 1964)
(hereafter referred to as CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT). A crime is defined as a
petty offense where the penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months
or the fine of not more than $500, or both. 62 Stat. 684 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §
1(3) (1950).
15. PROPOSED BILL § 1. Presumably the time set in this bill is before the
accused is arraigned in general sessions court. The defendant is not required
to plead and, in fact, cannot plead in the magistrate's court during a pre-
liminary examination or a proceeding to have the defendant bound over for
grand jury action. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963) ; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 43-232 (1962). The CRIMINAL JUSTICE AcT § 3006A (b) provides
for appointment when the defendant appears before the United States Com-
missioner.
16. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961).
17. Hamilton v. Alabama, supra note 16 (defenses could be lost at this time).
18. Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E2d 713 (1964). Where the de-
fendant was arraigned without counsel but rearraigned two days later with
counsel, the defendant's constitutional right to counsel was not violated.
19. 373 U.S. 59 (1963). In both White and Hamilton the defendant was
charged with a capital offense. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
However, the rationale of these cases will probably apply to non capital cases
since Gideon erased this distinction at the trial level.
20. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963). See also State v.
Lee, 143 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1965) (a highway patrolman is not required to ad-
vise traffic violators of the right to counsel).
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ment made by him cannot later be used at the trial.22 There is
one factor that could possibly lead to the requirement of counsel
at preliminary hearings in South Carolina. Although it may be
merely a nominal right in light of its questionable effectiveness,
the accused may cross-examine the state's witnesses in an at-
tempt to show lack of probable cause for binding the defendant
over for grand jury action.28 As Mr. Justice Sutherland said in
Powell v. Alabama :24
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of the law. . . . He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his de-
fense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.
26
Although Powell concerned the right to appointed counsel at
the trial level, it is arguable that the Supreme Court could apply
this reasoning and declare a preliminary hearing "critical" where
the defendant has the right of cross-examination.
The sixth amendment guarantee of right to counsel can also
apply prior to the preliminary hearing. In Escobedo 'v. Illinois
2 6
it was held that the accused must be permitted to consult with
his lawyer during police interrogation when the process shifts
from the investigatory to the accusatory stage.27 The problems
22. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963). See Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (decided on grounds other than the right to
counsel) where the validity of a Texas preliminary hearing was discussed.
However, the question was reserved as to whether other circumstances made
this proceeding a critical stage.
23. Another consideration is that this hearing is the defendant's only oppor-
tunity to find out anything about the state's case before trial. See Dancy v.
United States, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Application
of Hoff, 393 P.2d 619, 620 (Nev. 1964).
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. Id. at 68, 69. (Emphasis added.)
26. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
27. The Court held inadmissible a confession where the accused had been
denied the right to consult with retained counsel and had not been advised of
his right to remain silent. This case did not discuss the problem of appointment
of counsel, but if such a case were presented, the Court would seem to have
precedent in Escobedo to require appointment of counsel during interrogation.
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to counsel after an
indictment but prior to trial in a federal prosecution). See also An Historical
4
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of appointing counsel for the indigent during police interro-
gation are not covered by the bill, and it is possible that these
problems would better be resolved by the police than by an as-
signed counsel system. They, at least, could inform the person
of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel and thus
meet the chief objections of the Court in Escobedo. Moreover, if
appointment were required at this level, it would present major
difficulties; among them would be the problem of having some
official determine indigency before any interrogation and the
increased workload for appointed attorneys.
C. When, Does the Right to Counsel End?
The indigent criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to
counsel on appeal.28 Accordingly, the South Carolina bill pro-
vides that "a defendant who has been convicted and has been sen-
tenced for six months or more may apply to the trial judge or
to the resident judge for the appointment for appeal."29 Other
post-conviction remedies, however, are less clear. Habeas corpus,
for example, is considered to be essentially a civil proceeding
and the right to counsel does not attach.3 0 On the other hand,
an argument can be made that such a right does exist. Under the
Douglas v. California3' rationale the poor are denied equal pro-
tection because the rich can afford to retain counsel on appeal.
This reasoning would also apply to habeas corpus or other post-
conviction proceedings.3 2
Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE LJ.
1000 (1964). For a critical analysis of using the right to counsel as a basis for
these decisions see Enker & Elson, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United
States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 47 (1964).
28. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
29. PROPOSED BILL § 1. It appears that the attorney appointed at the trial
remains with the case through the appeal. There are provisions, however, for
withdrawal of counsel for good cause shown during the trial (§ 19) or during
pendency of an appeal (§ 20). The procedure under the CRImiNAL JusnCE ACT
§ 3006A(c) is similar.
30. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See also The
District Court of South Carolina Plan for Implementation of the Criminal
Justice Act, which provides that the act has no application to habeas corpus or
other proceedings, collateral to the original case. However, some states have
pacsed legislation for appointment of counsel in these proceedings. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1965) (Supp. 1963).
31. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
32. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel it Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 7 (1963).
5
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. Waiver of the Right
The bill provides for waiver of the right to counsel in all but
capital cases.33 The trial judge must make reasonable inquiry
of the defendant prior to the trial to determine if the defendant
has understandingly waived his right.3 4 Once this has been de-
cided a waiver form is executed35 and becomes part of the
record of the case.3 6 There is no absolute rule as to what con-
stitutes a waiver.3 7 Generally, it must be understandingly, com-
petently and intelligently made38 without the elements of pres-
sure or coercion.3 9 The waiver form in the bill appears to meet
these qualifications.
40
E. Determination of Indigency
The constitutional, factual determination of indigency has re-
ceived little clarification in cases concerning the rights of the
accused. 41 Mr. Justice Goldberg may have indicated a standard
in a recent case.
"Indigence must be conceived as a relative concept. An im-
poverished accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of
means. . . ." An accused must be deemed indigent when
"at any stage of the proceeding [his] lack of means . . .
substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a
33. PROPOSED BILL § 1. Waiver is also provided for in the CRIMINAL JusTIcE
AcT § 3006A(b).
34. PROPOSED BILL § 10.
35. PROPOSED BILL § 9.
36. PROPOSED BILL § 11. This is an important provision because no waiver
will be presumed from a silent record. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962); accord, Pitt v. MacDougall, 245 S.C. 98, 138 S.E.2d 840 (1964).
37. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case including the background and conduct
of the accused.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1937).
38. Pennsylvania ev rel Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1955).
39. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
40. The undersigned represents to the Court that he has been informed of
the charges against him, the nature thereof, the statutory punishment
therefor and the right to appointment of counsel upon his representation
to the Court that he is unable to employ counsel and the reasons therefor,
all of which he fully understands. The undersigned now states to the
Court that he does not desire the appointment of counsel, expressly waives
it and desires to appear in all respects in his own behalf, which he under-
stands he has the right to do.
PROPOSED BILL, FORM No. 2.
41. This may be the reason the CRIMINAL JUSTICE AcT § 3006A(b) specifies
defendants who are "financially unable to obtain counsel." The statute defines
no standard for the determination of indigency.
Vol. 171
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[particular] right or a claim of right. ... ." Indigence must
be defined with reference to the particular right asserted.
Thus, the fact that a defendant may be able to muster enough
resources, of his own or of a friend or relative, to obtain
bail does not in itself establish his non-indigence for the pur-
poses of purchasing a complete trial transcript or retaining
a lawyer.
4 2
Whether this will become the test of indigency is an open ques-
tion. The affidavit form contained in the bill4 3 covers the factual
question of the defendant's personal financial ability to employ
a lawyer and, therefore, will apparently conform to Mr. Justice
Goldberg's standard if that standard is adopted. On the basis
of the affidavit form and any other information brought to the
attention of the court, the trial judge determines indigency
under the proposed South Carolina act.
44
F. Compensation of Appointed CounseZ
Due to the prohibitive cost to the state, the bill does not pro-
vide for state payment of fees.45 It does, however, provide for a
judgment to be entered against the defendant in favor of the
attorney in an amount equal to the usual compensation for such
42. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (indigent's right
to a free transcript). Mr. Justice Goldberg's authority for this assertion was
the ATT'Y. GEN. COM14. ON POVERTY & THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE REP. (1963) indicated by quotation marks in the text above.
43. 1. By whom are you employed?
2. What is your present income? $_ Weekly, $ _ Monthly,
$_ Other.
3. Are you married? _ _
4. How many children under age 18 do you have?
5. What kind of car do you own?
6. Is it paid for? _ _ If not, what are the payments?
7. State specifically all property which you own and give location and
value.
8. How much do you owe?
I hereby declare under the penalties of perjury that the foregoing
answers are true, correct and complete and that I am financially un-
able to employ counsel to represent me in this action. I hereby request
the Court to appoint counsel to represent me in this action.
PROPOSED BILL, FOM No. 1
44. PROPOSED BILL § 8-A.
45. PROPOSED BILL § 1. See SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE CoaIM. REP. 1, 2
(Comm. Print 1964). The cost of such a system was estimated to be $169,847.00
on the basis of North Carolina's cost during a six month period. Compare the
SOUTH CAROLINA PROPOSED BILL with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (Supp. 1963)
which provides for attorneys fees to be paid by the state, and the CRIMINAL
JUsTIcE ACT § 3006A(d) (Maximum fees allowed-fifteen dollars per hour
for time expended in court, ten dollars for time expended out of court-$500
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cases and for garnishment of defendant's wages to satisfy the
judgment.48 Presumably, however, out of pocket expenses will
be paid by the state treasury.47
Compensation of appointed counsel is a controversial subject.
Some have argued that the indigent's rights will be better pro-
tected under a system that provides compensation ;48 others con-
tend that the defense of the indigent has always been the duty
of the attorney as an officer of the court.49 At least one attorney
feels that appointment without compensation violates constitu-
tional rights.3 0 The right of the indigent accused to an adequate
defense is the prime concern under either system and the legis-
lature must decide between placing the burden on the bar under
an uncompensated system or on the public with payment out of
state funds.
G. Choice of a PZan
The bill provides for county bar associations to adopt a plan
for the designation of attorneys to serve as assigned counsel. 51
An attorney will be appointed generally only in the county where
he resides52 and the indigent will not be able to select an attorney
to represent him.53
46. PROPOs BILL § 3. The purpose of this section is not so much to collect
a fee as it is to protect the attorney from defendants who are actually not
indigent. The perjury provision for a false affidavit (§ 5) will not practically
stop this problem. It is thought by many that if the defendant knows a judg-
ment will be entered against him, he will be more likely to inform the court
of his true financial status because if he later is found not to be indigent the
attorney will be able to collect his fee.
47. PROPOSED BILL § 1. "Upon application to the court by the indigent de-
fendant, or his appointed attorney, reasonable expenses to insure his defense
or appeal may be allowed by the court and payment shall be made by the State
Treasurer."
48. See Note, Criminal Justice Act of 1964: A Discussion of the Reasons
Why Assigned Counsel Must Be Compensated, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 212 (1965).
49. See Christensen, Requiem For An Abandoned Commitment, 51 A.B.A.J.
741 (1965).
50. See Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964) which held
that counsel must be awarded just compensation under the fifth amendment for
his services. This case was later overruled by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2673 (1965).
51. PROPOSED BILL § 12. The bar will provide the county clerk of court with
a list of attorneys in that particular county, and the assignments will be made
from this list See SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE Comx. REP. 4 (Comm. Print
1964). The CRIMINAL JUSTICE AcT § 3006A(a) provides for representation by
private attorney and/or attorneys furnished by a bar association or legal aid
society. There is no provision for a public defender system.
52. PRoPoSED BILL § 14.
53. PROPOSED BILL § 15.
[Vol. 17
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There is no provision for a public defender system,54 apparent-
ly because of its probable unworkability in sparsely populated
areas and the prohibitive cost to the state. But whatever the
motive, it seems that the assigned counsel plan is better suited to
this state at the present time.55
H. Services Other Than Counsel
There is no specific provision for investigative or expert ser-
vices.56 It is provided, however, that "upon application to the
court by the indigent defendant, or his appointed attorney, rea-
sonable expenses to insure his defense . . . may be allowed by
the court and payment shall be made by the State Treasurer,""
and this provision could be considered broad enough to allow
such services. It has been argued that the right to assistance
other than counsel is required on the basis of the rationale of the
Supreme Court in Douglas v. California.5" Douglas held that
to deny an indigent the right of an appeal which the rich enjoy
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
To deprive an indigent of expert and investigative services which
the rich can afford could therefore be a similar denial."9
I. Conclusion
The problems arising from the constitutional requirements of
counsel for the indigent accused will only be settled by future
court decisions. The Proposed South Carolina Indigent Defend-
ant Act is not intended to be a panacea, but whatever the short-
comings of the act, it will provide a uniform system for the ap-
pointment of counsel in this state. Whether or not one agrees
with Gideon, some action must be taken to meet the requirement
of providing an adequate defense for the indigent, and this pro-
posed legislation seems to be a step toward meeting this challenge.
JoHm U. B=u, III
54. See SOUTH CARoLNA LEGISLATIVE CoMM. REP. 2 (Comm. Print 1964).
55. See for a discussion of public defenders, David, Institutional or Private
Counsel: A Judges View of the Public Defender System, 45 MiNK. L. REv.
753 (1961). For a comparison of the assigned counsel plan with the public de-
fender system, see 1 SiLvERsTmN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 63 (1965).
56. Compare the CRIMINAL JUsTIcE Acr § 3006A(e) which specifically pro-
vides for "investigative, expert or other services necessary to an adequate de-
fense."
57. PROPOSED Bnu. § 1.
58. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
59. See Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal
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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY OF
EXISTENCE AND AMOUNT OF DEFENDANT'S
INSURANCE POLICY*
A controversial question which has divided the courts on
numerous occasions is whether the existence and amount of a
defendant's liability insurance coverage is discoverable under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Much has been written
about this question, but no definite answer has yet been reached.'
Insurance is unique in that it is virtually the only fact bearing
on the collectibility of the judgment which the plaintiff must
ascertain from the defendant, or not at all.2 The general rule,3 and
the one followed by the trial courts in South Carolina,4 is that
the existence of insurance may not be proved at the trial of a
case. This rule is subject to an exception where the plaintiff is
attempting to show ownership or control of a vehicle.5 An en-
tirely different problem arises, however, when the plaintiff seeks
to discover the existence and amount of the defendant's insurance
where control or ownership is not in issue, and although this
information, if obtained, would not be admissible into evidence.
The Federal Rules, by virtue of their express provisions and as
a result of their construction and application by the courts, af-
ford simple and effective means for narrowing the issues and ob-
taining evidence for use at trial. The discovery remedies they
set forth embody a far-reaching step toward achieving their prin-
cipal goal-elimination of the sporting theory of justice6 by
making "a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to fullest practi-
cable extent."7 The basic philosophy of the Federal Rules is that
* Sanders v. Ayrhart, 404 P2d 589 (Idaho, 1965).
1. Compare Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961) with Cooper
v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), noted in 27 U. CINx. L. REv.
298 (1958).
2. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-333 (1962). If either a motorist's name or license
tag number is known, the name of the insurance company with whom an in-
dividual motorist is insured may be obtained by requesting this information
from the S. C. Highway Department.
3. Randle v. Mitchell, 283 Ky. 501, 142 S.W.2d 124 (1940) ; Indian Refining
Co. v. Crain, 280 Ky. 112, 132 S.W.2d 750 (1939) ; Young v. Osgood, 86 N.H.
102, 163 Atl. 398 (1932); Mangino v. Bonslett, 109 Cal. App. 205, 292 Pac.
1006 (1930).
4. There have been however, no reported South Carolina cases expressly up-
holding this proposition which have been brought to the attention of the author.
5. Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
6. Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1948).
7. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
10
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prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the dis-
closure of all relevant information in the possession of any per-
son, unless such information is privileged. Certainly the require-
ment of relevancy should be given a liberal common sense con-
struction rather than in terms of narrow legalisms, but it is
arguable that it should not be expanded to allow the discovery
of all information that might possibly be relevant to the subject
matter of the action. In either event, however, relevancy will
furnish the plumbline for testing the asserted right of discovery."
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule
30(b) or (d), the depondent may be examined regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject-
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the iden-
tity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony Will
be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. 9
Rule 26(b), stated above, permits discovery of all matters
which are relevant and not privileged. Since no question of
privilege has been raised as to insurance policies, their relevance
to the subject matter becomes the sole question.
A recent Idaho case has focused attention upon this problem. 10
The plaintiff, whose wife was killed in an automobile accident,
served written interrogatories calculated to elicit information as
to "the coverage and limits of defendant's liability insurance
policy, if one existed."" The court ordered the defendant to
answer the interrogatories and he refused. The question was
appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho which held that the
defendant's insurance coverage was not subject to pre-trial dis-
covery in an accident case. Rule 26(b) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure' 2 is identical to Rule 26 (b) of the Federal Rules.
8. FD. 'R. Civ. P. 26(b).
9. Ibid.
10. Sanders v. Ayrhart, 404 P2d 589 (Idaho 1965).
11. Id. at 591.
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The courts which permit discovery in this area do so primarily
on the basis that this information is relevant and that a dis-
closure of the insurance coverage would greatly facilitate settle-
ments between the opposing parties. A leading case, Johane
v. Aberle,13 held that the test was not whether the information
sought would be admissible in evidence or relevant to the precise
issues in the case but whether it was relevant to the subject matter
involved. Maddox v. Grauman 4 concluded that since the ques-
tion of insurance was relevant to the subject matter after the
plaintiff prevailed, it was relevant to the subject matter while
the action was pending. In Maddox it was said that "an insur-
ance contract is no longer a secret, private, confidential arrange-
ment between the insurance carrier and the individual but it is
an agreement that embraces those whose person or property may
be injured by the negligent act of the insured."'15
The large number of vehicles in use today and the tendency for
fast driving has enormously increased the number of highway
motor accidents. These conditions have resulted in more string-
ent regulations designed for the protection and benefit of the
public and have furthered the legislative trend toward requiring
owners of motor vehicles not only to maintain liability insurance
but also to establish minimum requirements for limits of liability
as well. Obviously, this legislation is designed primarily to pro-
tect the public from the negligent operation of motor vehicles.
Braokett v. Woodall Food Prods.'6 acknowledged the import-
ance of this legislation in considering the problem of relevancy
by saying that "from the tenor and purposes of this legislation
it is obvious that such insurance policies are definitely relevant
to the subject matter of pending actions growing out of accidents
covered by such policies."' 71 A leading Colorado case held that
the procedure which allows depositions to elicit information con-
cerning the existence and policy limits of liability insurance is
the best rule "and the one which is more in accord with the
object, purpose and philosophy of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.' 8i The court felt that justice would be promoted by re-
moving secrets and mysteries through discovery. In addition, the
argument is made in those jurisdictions which have financial
13. 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).
14. 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1961).
15. Id. at 942.
16. 12 F.R.D. 4, 6 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
17. Id. at 6.
18. Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 522, 345 P.2d 1064, 1070 (1959).
Vol. 171
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responsibility laws that this statute gives injured persons a direct
interest in the insurance coverage, thus entitling them to dis-
covery of the amount.19
There is one final consideration to which the courts allowing
discovery have given weight. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules declares
that the rules shall be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Knowledge of the
defendant's insurance would permit a more realistic appraisal of
a case and undoubtedly lead to the settlement of cases which
otherwise would go to trial. Since Rule 26(b) is not in itself
decisive, those courts believe that the mandate of Rule 1 re-
quires that construction of Rule 26(b) which will lead to the
speedy determination of actions by settlement.20
Before presenting the arguments against the discovery of in-
surance coverage, the arguments set forth above should be briefly
examined. The first sentence of Rule 26(b) says that the de-
ponent may be examined regarding any matter "relevant to the
subject matter involved." If this phrase is liberally construed,
as it is in many instances, almost anything the examiner would
like to know becomes relevant to the subject matter; otherwise
he would not attempt to discover it. To say that a thing may be
generally relevant implies with equal weight that it may be
generally irrelevant. Another argument is that settlement negoti-
ations would be greatly aided by the disclosure of the defendant's
insurance coverage. This is not to say, however, that settlement
itself will necessarily be promoted. This argument is not en-
tirely without merit, for one of the objects of the law is to
promote out of court settlements, and undoubtedly a plaintiff's
counsel would not refuse a settlement in anticipation of a hun-
dred thousand dollar verdict in a case which has a ten thousand
dollar ceiling. On the other hand, settlement negotiations might
be hindered because one party knows of the high insurance
coverage and holds out for more, when under the circumstances
he would have ordinarily have settled for less if this information
had not been made available to him.
Courts which do not permit discovery of insurance base their
reasoning on one of two grounds, or both. The first is the in-
dividual's right to be free from unreasonable invasions of
19. Brackett v. Wood Food Prods., 12 F.R.D. 4, 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) ; Kurz
v. Collins, 6 Wis.2d 538, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959) ; Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1167
(1958).
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privacy. 21 To permit discovery would disclose the confidential
affairs of a defendant which were neither relevant nor necessary
to determine any issue in the litigation. The second is that the
information sought is not discoverable because it would not
ordinarily lead to the production of admissible evidence.
22 It
was said in Langois V. Allen23 that even though the insurance
coverage is relevant and important in one sense of the word,
unless it is relevant to the subject matter of the particular case,
it is not discoverable.
Rules of discovery adopted by our courts are designed to
serve the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action. . . [T]hat does not mean that information
should be discoverable which is desired only for the purpose
of placing one party in a more strategic position than he
otherwise would be by acquiring information that has noth-
ing to do with the merits of the action; there must be some
connection between the information sought and the action
itself before it becomes discoverable.24
Insurance coverage has been held exempt from discovery not
only because the information would be irrelevant and could not
be introduced at the trial, but also because the information dis-
closed would have nothing to do with the presentation of the
case nor come within one of the objectives of discovery pro-
cedure.25
Dictum in Hickman v. Tay or 26 gives an insight into what
the Supreme Court believes to be the purposes of pre-trial pro-
cedure. These three objectives are to narrow the issues, to provide
relevant information and to produce testimony reasonably cal-
culated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. If a broad
interpretation is to be given to the requirement of relevancy, it
cannot be denied that insurance coverage is relevant. On the
other hand, the wording of Rule 26(b) is clear and requires that
testimony obtained must appear "reasonably calculated to lead
21. E.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 285-86 (E.D. Ill. 1958) ; McClure
v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
22. E.g., GalIimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); Roembke v.
Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958); McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360
(E.D. Tenn. 1955) ; Goheen v. Goheen, 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 AtL 393 (Cir. Ct
1931).
23. 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962).
24. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (FIa. 1957).
25. McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Penn. 1952).
26. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
[Vol. 17
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to the discovery of admissible evidence." What admissible evi-
dence can possibly result from knowledge of the defendant's in-
surance coverage?
A basic concept of tort law insures the right of entry into our
courts to any person for the purpose of (1) proving liability
for an injury and (2) proving damages which resulted from the
injury. The existence and the amount of the defendant's insur-
ance, however, is in no way related to this concept. Civil pro-
cedure rules were formed to promote the inexpensive, speedy and
just determination of every action. Determination of an action,
as used by the Federal Rules, should be construed to mean the
disposition of a case by some means over which the court has
control and not by disposition of a case through settlement. Al-
though the law favors compromise through settlement, it does
not do so at the expense of giving one party an advantage over
the other in order to bring about settlement.
A majority, although not an overwhelming one, of state courts
which have squarely encountered this problem appear to have
barred discovery of insurance coverage when no independent
basis of relevancy existed to make the question of insurance bear
directly upon the issues in the case. 27 At present, the federal
courts are moving toward allowing discovery of liability policy
limits. Although this trend was recently supported in Ash v.
Farwell)2 8 it could be reversed by a strong opinion from another
federal court of appeals.
Wnaa&m W. Wn.xnws, JR.
27. Ruark v. Smith, 51 Del. 420, 147 A.2d 514 (1959); Di Pietruntonio v.
Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958); Verrastro v. Grecco, 21
Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703 (Super. Ct. 1958) ; Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d
693 (Fla. 1957) ; Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
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TRADE REGULATIONS-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-
SELLING AT UNREASONABLY LOW PRICES MEANS
SELLING AT PRICES LESS THAN FULLY DISTRIBUTED
COST WITH PREDATORY INTENT*
National Dairy Products Corp. is engaged in the business of
purchasing, processing, distributing and selling milk and other
dairy products throughout the United States under its national
labels of Sealtest and Kraft. Through its processing plant in
Kansas City, Missouri, National Dairy has for the past several
years been in competition with national and local dairies in
greater Kansas City. In this area it distributes its products
directly, while other markets are served by independent distribu-
tors who purchase milk from National Dairy and resell on their
own account.
National Dairy was charged with violations of both the Sher-
man Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. The iRobinson-Patman
counts charged National Dairy and Wise, a vice president and
director, with selling milk in those markets at "unreasonably low
prices for the purpose of destroying competition."' The indict-
ment specifically alleged that National sold milk below cost.
National Dairy and Wise moved to dismiss the Robinson-Pat-
man counts on the grounds that the statutory provision "unrea-
sonably low prices" is so vague and indefinite as to violate the
due process requirement of the fifth amendment and that an
indictment based on this provision is violative of the sixth amend-
ment in that it does not adequately apprise a defendant of the
charges. The district court, after rendering an oral opinion
holding that section three of the Robinson-Patman Act was un-
constitutionally vague and indefinite, granted the motion and
ordered dismissal of the section three counts. The order was ap-
pealed and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that section three
was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to sales made below
cost with specific intent to destroy competition2 and that sales
below cost were "unreasonably low."
In proscribing sales at 'unreasonably low prices for the pur-
pose of destroying competition', we believe that Congress
condemned sales made below cost for such purpose. Whether
* United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp. (8th Cir. 1965).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
2. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
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below cost refers to 'direct cost' or 'fully distributed' cost
or some other level of cost computation cannot be decided
in the abstract, and we do not reach that issue here.4
On remand it was held that even though National made no
sales below "direct cost", i.e., raw material (milk), processing
and container cost, it violated section three by selling below
"fully distributed cost" which includes the cost of production
plus the additional allocated delivery, selling and administrative
costs, including national advertising costs.
The Supreme Court cautioned that its opinion was not to be
construed as holding that every sale below cost constitutes a
violation of section three. They held that a necessary element to
such a violation was predatory intent and that such below cost
sales were not condemned when made in furtherance of a
legitimate commercial objective.5 An earlier case along this
same line held that "one who reduces his prices in defense of his
economic life cannot be guilty of eliminating competition or his
competitors."6 It is apparent, however, that this "legitimate
commercial objective" test leaves many questions unanswered.
Suppose sales are made below cost where both legitimate business
aims and predatory intent exist. This situation is not unusual
where a business or manufacturer may find it profitable to sell
or manufacture below cost to absorb a portion of its overhead
while realizing that a competitor as a result may be eliminated.
7
Or suppose sales are made below cost to increase volume of sales
and therefore decrease unit production cost while realizing that
a competitor near bankruptcy will be financially ruined. These
questions are as yet unsolved and can only be answered by future
litigation.
The primary question left unanswered by the earlier Supreme
Court Case is, what is cost?. The Court made it clear that it did
not reach the issue of whether below cost refers to "direct" or
"fully distributed" cost or some other level of cost computation.8
In resolving the issue in the instant case, the court of appeals
3. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, - F.2d __ (8th Cir.
1965).
4. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34 (1963).
5. Legitimate Commercial objectives might be the need to meet a com-
petitor's low price, move obsolete or perishable merchandise, or liquidate assets.
United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963).
6. Ben-Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1957).
7. 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 126, 131-132 (1963).
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said that below cost referred to "fully distributed" cost. How-
ever, questions still remain. Why was cost used as a standard
in the determination of "unreasonably low price?" How will
cases in the future construe below cost? Will below cost even be
used, be it "direct" or "fully distributed," as a standard in
determining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a price?
In order to more fully understand this decision and to deter-
mine whether it sets a standard upon which the vendor or pro-
ducer can judge his activity and thus prevent conviction under
the "unreasonably low price" provision, one must consider several
factors. It has been held that section three was intended to
carry only criminal sanctions. However, price discriminations, to
the extent that they were common to both section three of Robin-
son-Patman and section two of the Clayton Act, were also under-
stood to carry private remedies under the Clayton Act. This
means that although price discriminations are both criminally
punishable under section three of the Robinson-Patman Act and
subject to civil redress under section two of the Clayton Act,
selling at "unreasonably low prices" is subject only to criminal
penalties provided in section three of the Robinson-Patman Act.9
Due to the criminal provisions of section three, its constitution-
ality has been repeatedly questioned.'0 Indeed, the Report of
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws urged repeal of that section."1 In spite of, or as a
result of, the fears of the criminal provisions of section three,
there have been few cases concerning the criminal prohibitions
of that section, and in each of these instances the Robinson-
Patman charge was joined with a Sherman Act count which
alone might have achieved the same enforcement success.' 2 "The
paucity of litigation under section three has given it the status
9. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
10. The dissent in United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp. would have
held the act unconstitutional on the basis of United States v. Cohen Grocery
Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), wherein the Supreme Court held unconstitutional and
void for vagueness, a statute which made it a crime "for any person wilfully
to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge" in dealing in or with
any necessaries. The rule of Cohen was followed in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939), and Cline v. Frank Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). Cf.
United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
11. ATTY. GE s. NAT'L. Coism. ANrnnusT REP. 201 (1955).
12. ROWE, PnscE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN Act 468
(1962); Larve, Pitfalls for Price Competitors, 15 W. REs. L. REV. 35 (1963).
For a comprehensive treatment of the Department of Justice activities under
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of the proverbial 'sleeping dog' whose ferocity heretofore has
been untested."13
In determining whether below cost generally and below "fully
distributed cost" particularly will be the standard used in future
cases to determine what is meant by "unreasonably low," a num-
ber of observations appear relevant. Even before the Robinson-
Patman amendment was passed in 1936, below cost was used
as a factor in determining whether certain activity came within
the proscriptions of the Sherman Act.14  In 1958, after the
Robinson-Patman Amendment, the court also used the fact that
there was no evidence of selling below cost or at unreasonably
low prices to determine if there was a violation of the anti-trust
laws.'5 It would seem, therefore, that in view of the fact that
below cost has been used as a standard in determining violations
of the antitrust laws in the past, it was not improbable that it
would be used with reference to the "unreasonably low prices"
clause of the Robinson-Patman Act. This opinion was strength-
ened by the fact that there have been few reported cases
brought under the state statutes, which explicitly prohibit sales
below cost, wherein the cost of selling an item was determined.
It seems clear that references to cost are camouflage used to
shelter the statutes from attacks of unconstitutionality. 10 In
view of the many questions concerning the constitutionality of
the Robinson-Patman Act, perhaps the court used below cost in
order to set a standard for determining "unreasonably low prices"
to assure its constitutionality and increase the frequency of its
use. Since the state statutes prohibiting sales below cost have
been repeatedly held constitutional, it is unlikely that the "un-
reasonably low price" clause based on any standard of below
cost will be seriously challenged. Now, with the uncertainty of
section three at least reduced, will there be more criminal prosecu-
tions under it ?
13. 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 126, 128 (1963).
14. In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555
(1931), the Court used the fact of selling below cost as a factor in a conviction
for violations of the Sherman Act. In United States v. International Harvester
Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927), a factor supporting a finding that the Sherman Act
had not been violated was that there had been no sales below cost. In Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court said that sales below
cost without a justifying business reason may come within the proscriptions of
the Sherman Act.
15. Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 64 (D.N.J. 1958).
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Assuming finally that "unreasonably low prices" means prices
below cost, the question, what is below cost, remains. As al-
ready noted, the court held below cost to mean below "fully dis-
tributed cost" as opposed to below "direct cost" as urged by the
appellant. Although the problems of defining "cost" are mani-
fold,17 cost accounting has reached the exactness of a science and
the courts have recognized the elements which go into establish-
ing cost.18 The holding that below cost means below "fully dis-
tributed cost" is consistent with prior interpretations of "cost" 19
and the meaning of "cost" as established in the state statutes. The
state statutes that apply to producers usually define costs separ-
ately for production and distribution. Production costs include
raw materials, labor, and overhead, while distribution costs in-
clude the lower of invoice or replacement cost plus the "cost of
doing business." "Cost of doing business" and "overhead" are
defined as including labor, rent, depreciation, selling expense,
maintenance, interest on borrowed capital, delivery expense,
credit losses, licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising.20 On the
basis of common sense and the foregoing authority, it is evident
that the holding that below cost meant below "fully distributed
cost" was clearly correct and the only reasonable conclusion under
the circumstances.
It is immediately realized that many questions remain un-
answered concerning the ramifications of section three. Is "un-
reasonably low price" always synonomous with below cost after
this decision? What would be the result if sales were one cent
below cost or one cent above cost? Over how long a period
does an alleged violator have to sell at an "unreasonably low
price?" Notwithstanding the many unanswerables, it is evident
from this decision that a vendor or producer now has notice
that if, intending to destroy competition, he sells his products at
a price which is below the "fully distributed cost" of the product,
he is subject to the criminal sanctions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
RiAEUi~n Horsow
17. See 57 YALE L.J. 391 (1948).
18. F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden, 98 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
19. Cf. Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178
F.2d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 1949).
20. 15 W. REs. L. RIv. 35, 42-43 (1963). See 57 Y=A L.J. 391, 412 (1948).
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